Sunday, July 12, 2020

The Theology of Liberalism

In Eric Nelson's newish book The Theology of Liberalism, he argues that Rawlsian liberalism represents a break with the liberal theories that went before it. Rawls is skeptical of merit, very concerned with the seeming arbitrariness of the distribution of talent, and wary of the inegalitarian distribution of opportunities that results from inherited inequalities of ability and resources. Liberals before Rawls viewed people differently. They "rejected the notion of moral arbitrariness. Their animating conviction ...inferred the possibility of human freedom and merit from the justice of God" (xi)  


Nelson's book is, in a way, a defense of the older approach. Nelson writes, 

"There is something deeply inegalitarian about Rawlsian egalitarianism. In place of the ... insistence on the equal moral power of all human beings to shape their lives in accordance with virtue, Rawls gives us an essentially hierarchical account of human nature in which the “better endowed” take the place of the Augustinian elect. (71)

Rawls's desert-skepticism then motivates his support for broadly egalitarian redistributive policies. But As Nelson points out, this move is too quick, and even if one is skeptical about deservingness, the existing distribution of resources may still be morally significant. 


Nelson argues that even if people have no natural rights to the distribution of natural resources or talents they inherit, it doesn't follow that the present-day owners of resources aren't entitled to them. After all, the distribution was to some extent a result of good-faith actors who, if they were acting wrongly, were not blameworthy for their wrongdoing. Also, those who are disadvantaged by the present-day distribution would not have otherwise existed. And since we cannot identify the victims of an unjust historical distributive pattern, we also cannot identify a sound principle of rectification. 


So even if the present-day distribution is in some ways arbitrary and free from considerations of merit, people may still have some kind of a claim to their inherited share of resources. Nelson writes, 

The moral rights of those who have purchased natural resources ought to be defended even by those who ... regard rules allowing the ownership and exchange of natural resources as unjust. I suggested that those holding such a view should concede that we often have reason to attribute good faith even to those who act in accordance with unjust rules, and that such good-faith rule-following itself gives rise to claims...My arguments should have important consequences for all dignitarian liberals—that is, for all of those who defend liberalism on the grounds that it respects the inviolability and “separateness” of persons— even if they dissent from libertarians in arguing for a “patterned,” rather than an “historical” approach to the theory of justice. For any theory of justice will necessarily confront the question of rectification. Whether we suppose that, in the abstract, the principle of justice requires equality of resources, equality of opportunity for advantage, the delivery of basic capabilities to all persons, or the maximization of the welfare of the least well-off, we have to consider the moral significance of the fact that we inhabit a world that has been structured by an infinite number of good-faith human transactions that conflict with our chosen principle. (155)


This is a really interesting argument. Here is how Nelson's argument could inform ongoing debates about distributive justice that go like this: 


A: It's wrong to enforce redistributive policies that create a particular distribution or end-state pattern of resources because such a system would violate people's rights! 


B: People don't really have natural rights that align with the current property system though. And people certianly don't deserve what they earn within the current system. If anything, the current property system violates rights! So redistribution is good because it remedies the rights violations that are inherent in the current system and it doesn't violate anyone's well-deserved entitlements. 


Nelson: Even if the existing distribution is in some sense arbitrary and undeserved, it could still be disrespectful to treat people as if their claims within the current system are irrelevant. 


So Nelson offers a kind of middle-ground, where existing distributions can carry some weight without assuming that any redistribution necessarily violates people's rights. So redistribution is not necessarily unjust, nor is it morally required. Again, here's Nelson on this point. 

It is not mere reliance on existing rules that commands our respect, but rather the good-faith reliance of those whose “minds,” “feelings,” and “consciences” assure them (mistakenly but not unreasonably) of the justice of those rules. What the requisite sort of respect amounts to—whether it should be conceived as a trumping consideration or simply as a pro tanto reason for deference (and if the latter, how it should be weighed against other concerns)— must of course remain an open question. But it is a question that political theorists should be interested in answering. (157)